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Focusing primarily on ofﬁcial sources, this essay examines perceptions of Catholicism and
Catholics from the 1860s. Throughout this period, the Russian government almost
instinctively understood “Catholic” and “Polish” as synonyms, even when it explicitly
denied doing so. This conﬂation of religious and ethnic categories colored ofﬁcial policies
toward other Catholics such as Belarusians and Lithuanians who ostensibly were potential
allies against the Poles. Even measures such as the attempt to introduce Russian into
Belarusian Catholic churches foundered in part on ofﬁcialdom’s profound distrust for
Catholicism. This essay is a contribution to our understanding of religious and national
categories in late Imperial Russia and also to the study of russiﬁcation in this period.
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distributed by Elsevier Limited. All rights reserved.Late Imperial Russia, to paraphraseMarx, was haunted by
a specter – the specter of Catholicism. If the “Catholic ques-
tion”doesnot generallyﬁgurehigh in the list of social, ethnic,
and religious ills plaguing the Russian Empire, this is mainly
because the “Catholic question” is subsumed into another
category: “the Polish question.” The perceived – and often
very real – connection between “Polish” and “Catholicism”
will be a central theme of this paper. For Russian ofﬁcialdom
(the main source and focus here), “militant” and “fanatical”
Catholicism (there was apparently no other kind) was the
most importantweaponof “warringPolonism.”Andcertainly
the close tie between Polish and Catholic identity cannot be
denied. After all, the VirginMary often ﬁgures as the “Queen
of Poland.” Still, of the over eleven million Catholics counted
by the 1897 census, not even eight million were Poles by
ethnicity. Aside from the Poles, Lithuanians, Belarusians,Paciﬁc Research Center, HanyaLatvians, Ukrainians, and Germans were Catholic in signiﬁ-
cant numbers.1 Russian ofﬁcialdom, however, nearly always
regarded the tsar’s Catholic subjects as either Poles, Polon-
ized, or under Polish inﬂuence – and in any case highly
suspect in their loyalty to the Russian state.
This article will examine ofﬁcial Russia’s perceptions of
Catholicism from the 1860s to the outbreak of WorldWar I.
I will start with the 1863 uprising and its suppression – an
event of almost apocalyptic importance for Russian atti-
tudes toward the Poles. A second topic will be the failed
attempts to introduce the Russian language into Catholic
churches in the Northwest provinces (roughly, present-day
Lithuania and Belarus) in the 1860s and 1870s. This policy
has hitherto generally been interpreted as part of a general
program of “russiﬁcation,” an interpretation (and concept)
which I ﬁnd problematic. I will then examine the two
largest groups of non-Polish Catholics: Lithuanians and
Belarusians. While both of these ethnicities made up over1 For the total number of Catholics in the Empire according to the
census of 1897 (11,420,927) see Tablitsa, 1904. For a breakdown of reli-
gious groups by mother tongue, see Bauer, Kappeler, & Roth, 1991, Table
006, volume B, p. 77.
ng University. Produced and distributed by Elsevier Limited. All rights reserved.
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when at all – only exclusively in the context of Polish vs.
Russian inﬂuences.4 Lietuvos centrinis valstybinis istorijos archyvas (LVIA, Vilnius), 72–73,
92.
5 Lietuvos centrinis valstybinis istorijos archyvas (LVIA, Vilnius), 131.1. The insurrection of 1863 and its aftermath
One unintended consequence of Alexander II’s attempt
to loosen political constraints in the Russian Empire was
the Polish Insurrection of 1863. The trauma of 1863 on both
Polish and Russian politics for at least two generations
cannot, I think, be overestimated. For the Poles, the
crushing of the uprising and the reprisals that followed it
discredited activist “romantic nationalism.” For Russian
conservatives, the uprising was a clear warning that
attempts to reform Russia’s antiquated social and political
structure could only lead to chaos and revolution.
Furthermore, Russian distrust of Poles was corroborated by
their “treasonous” behavior in the early 1860s. After the
experiences of these years, Russian ofﬁcialdom would be
extremely wary of any suggestion that a political compro-
mise with the Polish nobility could be reached. Instead,
government policy after 1863 rested on a combination of
repression and wishful thinking that the Polish peasantry
(unlike the landlords) remained fundamentally loyal to the
tsar and his government.2
Even before the actual outbreak of the insurrection, both
Russians and Poles agreed that the Catholic Church and
clergy played a central role in the Polish patriotic move-
ment. Patriotic hymns were sung in churches, clergy took
part in patriotic funeral processions, and individual priests
even led “mutinous bands”. Time and again one encounters
the ﬁgure of the militant Catholic priest leading hapless
peasants against the Russian authorities. Or, in another
familiar trope, we have Catholic fanaticism itself fueling
peasants’ wrong-headed actions against the “legal
authority,” that is, the Russians. Remarkably, Russian ofﬁ-
cials seemed to go out of their way to explain away the
peasantry’s actions by blaming it not on Catholic agitators
or simply the pernicious effect of intolerant Catholicism
itself.
The uprising was preceded by several years of unrest,
patriotic demonstrations, and clashes between (Russian)
troops and (Polish) demonstrators. Both the symbols of
Catholicism and actual Catholic clergy played an important
role in these disturbances. A Russian ofﬁcial, Ivan Nikotin,
noted in his memoirs that already in the late 1850s in Vil’na
“secret preparations for mutiny” were being organized
behind the front of the local St. Vincent de Paul organiza-
tion.3 Nikotin’s remarks on the role of Catholicism are
typical for Russian ofﬁcialdom. He recalled, for example,
that a campaign of patriotic hymn-singing in Catholic
churches beganwhen in the presence of bishop Krasinski in
early May 1861 the hymn “Bo _ze cos Polske˛” was sung. Even
when priests were not seen at the front of demonstrations,2 It is deﬁnitely time for a new historical synthesis on the 1863
uprising. Meanwhile, see Leslie, 1963; and the classic tome, Kieniewicz,
1972.
3 Nikotin, 1905. The original of this interesting memoirs is in: Lietuvos
centrinis valstybinis istorijos archyvas (LVIA, Vilnius), f. 439, op. 1, b. 136.Nikotin claimed, they were the force behind the scenes
manipulating the women and children who took more
visible roles.4 And of course there was the ﬁgure of “ksia˛dz
Mackiewicz” who led “mutinous bands” in Kovno prov-
ince.5 Other priests, less activist or more timid, contented
themselves with leading secret schools where, in cooper-
ationwith Polish peace mediators (mirovye posredniki) they
instilled children with the Polish nationality.6
For Nikotin, rather like his mentor M. N. Murav’ev, the
Catholic clergy was solidly opposed to Russian rule (in
particular in the Northwest – Lithuanian and Belarusian –
provinces) and ﬁrm in their Polish patriotism. “In general
one may say with certainty that the Roman Catholic clergy,
from their arch-pastors [i.e., Bishops and Archbishops] on
down, were devoted body and soul to the Polish cause
(predano. pol’skoi sprave).”7 In large part, Nikotin argued,
the Russian government itself was to blame for the present
situation. Because the Russian authorities since the 1850s
had reduced observation and restrictions on the Catholic
clergy, the latter had naturally taken advantage of this
“softness” to pursue their own anti-Russian aims. Once the
ministry of internal affairs ceased its “surveillance of Popish
militancy (nadzor nad papskim voinstvom), the priests and
monks, taking note of this and enjoying unlimited freedom,
began to propagandize Latinism and Polishness (latinstvo i
pol’shchina) in this ancient Russian land [i.e., the Northwest
provinces].”8 In other words, the congruency between
Polish and Catholic identities was, at least in the 1863
rebellion, complete. For an ofﬁcial like Nikotin, to ﬁght
Polish disloyalty and to prevent further disturbances and
challenges to “legal authority” (i.e., the Russians), the
Catholic Church had to be subjected to strict surveillance
and restrictive measures.
It is difﬁcult to ascertain absolutely just what role
Catholic priests played in the Polish patriotic demonstra-
tions and ensuing uprising of 1863, but it would have been
amazing if they had abstained entirely. After all, in the
nineteenth century the only “national” institution the Poles
retained – in particular in the Russian Empire – was the
Catholic Church.9 In the absence of fully Polish educational
institutions, it is only natural that priests – the most literate
members of village communities – would teach children
prayers, hymns, and the rudiments of literacy. With these
“unofﬁcial” lessons also came perhaps inevitably a certain
dollop of anti-Russian and anti-Orthodox sentiments.
Churches were often the only structures suitable for large
gatherings and meetings, and also one main public site for
the use of the Polish language. While the liturgy in Catholic
churches was of course in Latin, hymns, the homily, and
various prayers would be said in the local language –6 Lietuvos centrinis valstybinis istorijos archyvas (LVIA, Vilnius), 161.
7 Lietuvos centrinis valstybinis istorijos archyvas (LVIA, Vilnius), 92.
8 Lietuvos centrinis valstybinis istorijos archyvas (LVIA, Vilnius) 215.
9 In Austria, of course, the majority of the population was Catholic; in
Prussia Catholicism was more linked with Polish-ness, but German
Catholics were far from rare. A “Russian Catholic,” on the other hand, was
nearly a contradiction in terms.
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nian even in the 1860s). When individuals died or were
killed by government repressions – as happened in early
1861 – it was inevitable that Catholic clergy would
accompany the bodies to their ﬁnal resting places. These
funeral processions, in particular in Warsaw, then became
ﬂash points for further clashes.
The Russian authorities, in any case, were ﬁrmly
convinced that the Catholic clergy not only supported the
anti-government revolt, but also was its main instigator.
Quickly after arriving in Vil’na, Governor General M. N.
Murav’ev dashed off a letter to the Catholic bishop of
Wilno, Adam Stanis1aw Krasinski. Murav’ev reminded
Krasiñski of a personal conversation in which he had
pointed out the involvement of Catholic clergymen in the
uprising. At that time, Krasinski had promised to curtail
these activities, however since then, “the local Catholic
clergy has taken out the most lively and active part in
inciting the people toward the mutiny (bozbuzhdenii nar-
oda k miatezhu).” This continuing incitement, Murav’ev
continued, had caused the “regrettable necessity” of having
two priests executed. In an effort to prevent such unfor-
tunate incidents, Murav’ev asked the bishop to urge priests
to calm, not agitate, the population and demanded along
these lines a copy of instructions that the bishop had sent to
his subordinates.10 The Catholic response was a model of
evasion, merely stating that “the clergy remains true to its
occupation” (Dukhovenstvo prebyvaet vernym svoemu
delu), and was not even signed by the bishop himself.11
Later in June Krasinski was deported to Viatka.
In Warsaw, too, the Catholic clergy played a signiﬁcant
role in the patriotic movement. As in Wilno, churches
became gathering places for the singing of patriotic hymns,
and funeral processions took on a patriotic and anti-
Russian character. When the popular Archbishop of War-
saw Antoni Fija3kowski died in early October 1861, funeral
services for him were transformed into patriotic demon-
strations. The Russian authorities feared worse nationalist
disorders with the upcoming anniversary of Tadeusz
Kosciuszko’s death, on 15 October. Despite the declaration
of martial law, Poles continued to gather in churches and
monasteries to sing hymns and patriotic songs (the Russian
authorities, to be sure, did not clearly differentiate between
the two genres). Matters came to a head when Russian
troops surrounded three churches with orders to arrest all
those inside. Many succeeded in ﬂeeing, but 1678 men
were arrested and taken to the citadel, a notorious military
prison. (Kieniewicz, 1972)
In response to this outrage – Russian troops had violated
the sanctity of Catholic Churches – the administrator of the
Warsaw diocese took the fateful step of closing all churches10 LVIA, f. 378, op. 154, p/o 1863, d. 1801, ll. 2-3 (the letter is dated 26
May 1863).
11 LVIA, f. 378, op. 154, p/o 1863, d. 1801, ll. 20-22, “Iz Vilenskoi Rimsko-
Katolicheskhoi Dukhovnoi Konsistorii” to Murav’ev, 4 June 1863. Kra-
sinski was deported to Viatka later that month “for patriotic engagement
and the refusal to condemn the January Uprising” (Nitecki, 1987). For
more on Catholic clergy in the uprising, see LVIA, f. 378, op. 154, p/o 1863,
d. 13 (“O neblagonamerennykh deistviiakh Katolicheskogo dukhovenstva
v Vilenskoi gubernii”).in protest.12 The Russian authorities could hardly ignore
such a blatant challenge to their authority. Charles Lambert
resigned as the head of the Russian administration in
Warsaw and was replaced by the far less conciliatory
General A. N. Lüders. The highest Catholic administrator,
Antoni Bia1obrzeski, was arrested and exiled to the Russian
interior.
The Insurrection itself broke out in early 1863 and,
despite initial panic in St. Petersburg, had next to no chance
of success. By the end of the year, few towns remained in
the insurgents’ hands, and the Russian authorities were
seeking out and destroying “rebel bands” in the country-
side. Ofﬁcial reports written in the wake of the uprising
once again blamed it, and Polish antipathy to Russian rule,
in large part to Catholicism. In his 1863 report, the
government of Vil’na province noted that one reason for
the continued anti-Russian spirit among the local middle
and upper classes was the fact that all local education was
in the Catholic clergy. The following year, the same
governor was even more explicit: “The most malevolent
and danger enemy of Russia during the recent disturbances
was the Roman Catholic clergy. Forgetting the sacredness of
their calling, they placed themselves at the head of the
mutiny.”13
Along similar lines, the governor of Minsk province
reported that the Catholic clergy and especially monks had
actively supported the uprising, hence Catholicmonasteries
in the area should be closed.14 His colleague in Kovno
province reiterated the claim that the main source of
“revolutionary propaganda,” especially in the countryside,
was the Catholic clergy. He did admit, however, that the
uprising found broad sympathy: “for a short time the entire
populationof theprovincewith fewexceptionswas agitated
(vzvolnovano).”15 A few years later, the governor general of
Vil’na, A. L. Potapov wrote, “The Roman Catholic population
in general is devoted to its religion, and in Kovnoprovince.
this devotion comes close to fanaticism.” In thepast the local
Catholic clergy has done its best to polonize the region and
on the whole “even to the present, in the great majority of
cases, remains true to its previous convictions. The past
mutiny found in them almost the only strong support
(pochti edinstvennaia tverdaia opora).” At present the
Catholic clergy did not dare manifest its anti-Russian and
anti-Orthodox sentiments openly, but it continued to do so
in private. Only a very few Catholic clergymen recognized
that government measures after 1863 do not constitute
“interference in the dogmas of the [Catholic] religion.”16
Indeed, many harsh measures against the Catholic
Church were carried out after 1863. Many monasteries – in12 Leslie, 1963. Remarkably, the chief rabbi of Warsaw, Ber Meisels, also
closed Jewish places of worship in solidarity with his Catholic colleagues:
Kupfe, 1953.
13 Rossiiskoi gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv (RGIA, St. Petersburg),
f. 1267, op. 1, 1864, d. 4, l. 66 (Vil’na governor’s report, 1863); Rossiiskoi
gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv (RGIA, St. Petersburg), f. 1281, op. 7,
1865, d. 34, l. 68 (Vil’na governor’s report, 1864).
14 RGIA, f. 1267, op. 1. 1864, d. 7, l. 42.
15 RGIA, f. 1281, op. 6–1864, d. 44, l. 82.
16 RGIA, f. 1263, op. 4, d. 46, ll. 20-22v (Vil’na governor general report for
1868–1870).
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Polish territory –were shut down. Clergy and bishops were
removed from their parishes and exiled into the Russian
interior, though seldom to Siberia.17 While St. Petersburg
insisted that its only aim was to root out politically
dangerous elements and not to crush the Catholic Church,
Catholics outside the empire remained skeptical. In Paris,
Father Louis Lescoeur published a series of books and
pamphlets portraying the martyrdom of the Catholic clergy
at the hands of the Russians. For Lescoeur, the aim of the
Russian government was nothing less than the total russi-
ﬁcation and conversion to Orthodoxy of the population of
these lands (the Northwest Provinces): “Faire du peuple
polonais et ne particulier des provinces limitrophes de la
Russie, un peuple russe et des provinces russes, ce fut de
tout temps l’ambition des conquérants russes.”18 True to
the national calculus of the day, Lescoeur ignores the fact
that the majority of local Catholics were not Poles by
ethnicity or language. For him, just as for Russian ofﬁ-
cialdom, the power of the Catholic ¼ Polish equation
blotted out other ethnic groups of Catholic faith.
2. Language in Catholic churches after 1863
As is well known, the liturgy in Catholic churches was
held – until quite recently – in Latin throughout the world.
But the so-called “supplementary service,” that is, songs,
prayers, sermons, and the like, were to be held in the “local
tongue.” InWarsaw, that languagewould certainlybePolish.
But in Grodno, Kaunas, or Vil’na the matter was somewhat
more complicated. In the late 1860s, when the memory of
the uprising and the Catholic clergy’s role in it was still fresh
in the minds of tsarist ofﬁcials, it was noted that the “local
language” for many Catholics in the Northwest provinces
was not, in fact, Polish. Sowhywere church prayers, hymns,
etc., so often uttered in that language? Particularly irksome
forRussianofﬁcialswas the idea that their ethnicbrethrenof
the Catholic faith, the Belarusians, might be undergoing
polonization even now through the use of Polish in Catholic
services. Thus was born the project to introduce Russian in
certain Catholic churches of the Northwest provinces.19
After 1863, the Russian authorities created in Vil’na the
“Revision Commission on the Affairs of the Roman Catholic
Clergy in the Northwest Provinces.” In 1867 this committee
discussed which language should be used in Catholic
sermons. One recommendation read: “. in the ﬁve
Western provinces of Russia, priests should preach only in
the Russian language; in Kovno province in Lithuanian or
Russian; the use of Polish by priests is forbidden.” This
prohibition was justiﬁed by the “experience over many
years” of Catholic priests’ hostility to the government and
“all things Russian.”20 In the end, however, the commission17 RGIA, f. 821, op. 150, d. 223. This compendium of Catholic priests
exiled from the Western Provinces gives a total of 292 priests exiled to
central Russia from the entire Empire, including the Kingdom of Poland,
in the decade or so after 1863.
18 Lescoeur, 1903. See also his Lescoeur, 1873.
19 Some of what follows is taken from Weeks, 2001a. For another view
on the same subject, see Staliûnas, 1999.
20 LVIA, l. 378, BS 1867, b. 2526, ll. 37v, 39v.did not adopt such draconian measures. Noting that the
language of Catholic sermons was but one part of the larger
“question of removing the Polish language from the Roman
Catholic confession in Russia, a question under consider-
ation by the Commission and still not resolved in principle
[po sushchestvu],” banning Polish would be “at the very
least, untimely and inappropriate.”21
The Commission’s reluctance notwithstanding, the new
governor general of Vil’na, A. L. Potapov, reopened the
debate: “The necessity of introducing the Russian language
into Catholic religious services is indicated by past experi-
ence. since for the masses religion and language are the
only assimilating principles. Hence we must now use these
very principles as much as possible in our efforts to russify
the Western territory.”22 The Department of Foreign
Confessions (Departament dukhovnykh del inostrannykh
ispovedanii) was not so sure. Its report of November 1869
cautiously noted that hitherto use of the Russian language
in religious services had been “the exclusive right of the
ruling [gospodstvuiushchaia] Orthodox church.” It also
agreed that it would be advisable to bring in non-Polish
Catholic clergy, in particular as bishops.23 As was so often
the case in the Russian Empire, a “special committee” was
formed to discuss the issue.
The conclusions of this special committee were
enshrined in the law of 25 December 1869 which allowed
the use of Russian in non-Orthodox religious establish-
ments. However, this decision was not unanimous. The
Ober-prokuror of the Holy Synod himself was quoted in the
committee’s report as having said that “allowing the use of
Russian in foreign churches [v inovercheskikh tserkvakh] is
a double-edged sword.” Still, he concluded that the
government would accrue more beneﬁts than harm from
a “separation of religious and national questions.”24 In
order to avoid “the appearance of a violation of [religious]
toleration,” the measurewasmade entirely voluntary. Local
ofﬁcials were then informed of the decision early in 1870.25
Some local ofﬁcials welcomed this measure as just and
timely. The governor of Grodno province waxed enthusi-
astic in his annual report for 1869 (written in mid-1870):
The religious question, touched upon by Your Imperial
Highness’s recent decision allowing the introduction of
Russian into religious services of foreign confessions in my
opinion will [by means of this measure] be solved correctly
and without any disturbances [bez vsiakikh potriasenii].
Gradually, bit by bit the Russian language will assume its
proper place in Catholic churches where Russians worship
and will destroy the Polish trappings in which local Cathol-
icism clothes itself, thereby rendering it politically harmless.
Of course this is a task not of the immediate future but a task
that in Grodno province can certainly be carried out.2621 LVIA, l. 40. The term “untimely” – prezhdevremenno – used to describe
any measure thought to be too radical is a very common one in the
deliberations of Russian bureaucrats of this epoch.
22 RGIA, f. 821, op. 125, d. 277, l. 39. This letter is dated 6 June 1869.
23 RGIA, f. 821, op. 125, d. 277, ll. 55-64, quotation from l. 56v. Emphasis
in original. The report is dated 21 November 1869.
24 RGIA, f. 821, op. 125, d. 277, l. 68v.
25 RGIA, f. 821, op. 125, d. 277, ll. 137-170.
26 RGIA, f. 1281, op. 7, 1870, d. 56, ll. 42v-43.
T. Weeks / Journal of Eurasian Studies 2 (2011) 52–5956The governor noted that the local clergy was generally
sympathetic to this measure and had not attempted any
“openly hostile measures.” It should be noted that the only
churches that would come in question for this reform,
according to the governor, are those “where Russians
[Belarusians, of course] worship.” The governor empha-
sized that the successful introduction of Russian would not
be implemented quickly; this would be a matter of years, if
not a generation or more.27
Other governors agreed that the most effective measure
would be the removal of Polish from local Catholic
churches. The governor of Kovno (Kaunas) province put it
this way: “The government’s task can consist only in the
effort to reestablish peace with the Catholic church by
cutting off Catholicism from Polonism.” It was vital, he
continued, to assure the local “Samogitian” [zhmudskii]
masses that their Catholic faith would be respected by the
government while at the same time moving cautiously but
consistently to remove Polish from local churches and
seminaries. Instead of Polish, the “local Samogitian dialect”
(i.e., Lithuanian) should be introduced for the supplemental
services. In seminaries Latin and Russian should be used.
The governor concluded that true peace between the
Russian authorities and the local Catholic church could be
reached only by the removal of Bishop “Volonchevskii”
(Valancius), “whose perﬁdious stubbornness and criminal
activity exceed all bounds.”28 In the less Catholic provinces
of Minsk, Mogilev, and Vitebsk the annual reports for 1869
and 1870 make no mention of this issue at all.
The Russian authorities immediately undertook the
translation into Russian and publication of several Catholic
works, including a “Short History of the Church,” a catechism,
and a missal.29 Getting these works into the local Catholic
churches was not easy. The Catholic Dziekan of the city of
Wilno, Stanis1aw Piotrowicz, denounced in circulars and
a sermon in Vilna the attempts to use Russian in Catholic
churches, condemned the new prayer books, and labelled as
traitors to the church those clergymenwho had endorsed the
new measures, most especially Piotr _Zylinski, Antoni Nie-
meksza, and Edward Tupalski.30 As one would expect, Pio-
trowicz was immediately arrested and sent into exile
(to Arkhangelsk). Following less overt but probably more
effective tactics, the Lithuanian Bishop M. Valanèius
(Wo1onczewski)declined toaccept thenewRussian-language27 RGIA, f. 821, op. 125, d. 277, l. 43. The following year the same
governor complained about the activities of certain over-zealous indi-
viduals in 1864–1865 who had applied pressure on peasants to convert to
Orthodoxy. Such activities, the governor emphasized, could only discredit
the government, Orthodoxy, and the “Russian cause” in the Western
borderlands. RGIA, f. 1284, op. 67, 1872, d. 167, ll. 20v-22.
28 RGIA, f. 1284, op. 69, 1871, d. 133, ll. 23v, 24v. For a rather different
(Soviet) portrayal of Bishop Valancius, stressing his conservatism, see
Vëbra, 1968. A new and thorough scholarly biography is Merkys &
Valanèius, 1999.
29 For a list of these works see Olszamowska-Skowroñska, 1865–1903;
and Sipovic, 1973.
30 Przybyszewski, 1987. Edward Tupalski, Antoni Niemeksza, and Piotr
yliñski, prelates who supported – indeed pushed for – the use of Russian
in Catholic churches in this region, are clearly the villains of the piece.
See, for example, Przybyszewski, 1987, pp. 9–16; Kubicki, 1936; Lescoeur,
1903.missalson thepretext that anychanges insuchbooksrequired
the express permission of the Vatican.31 Perhaps the best
indication of the Catholic clergy’s success in preventing the
distribution anduse of the newRussian-language catechisms,
missals, and histories is the fact that almost no copies of these
translations have survived to the present day.
Getting local Catholics to accept the use of Russian in
serviceswasalsonoeasymatter. Aswas reported fromMinsk
province to the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 1877, when in
the summer of that year the Belarusian Catholic priest
Vashkevich used Russian in his church, “the parishioners left
the church and later a crowd of fanaticizedwomen closed up
the churchwith their own locks, threatened and insulted the
priest Vashkevich, declaring that they would never allow
[Russianagain].” In lightof thehostility toward the priest, the
Russian authorities in Minsk province found it necessary to
acquiesce in the transfer of the priest. (Kubicki). The secret
police (Third Section) in the province suspected – and
claimed to have evidence proving this suspicion – that Polish
landlords encouraged the Catholic peasantry in their oppo-
sition to allowing the use of Russian in Catholic churches.32
When the Russian authorities confronted the head of the
Vilna Catholic bishopric (because of the break in relations
with the Vatican, he did not bear the title “bishop”), the
“administrator” repliedverypolitely,denyingtheexistenceof
“intrigues” against the use of Russian and claiming that
Catholic priests were reluctant to introduce Russian into
churchesvery simplybecause of the “contempt, hatred, and–
as has happened onmore than one occasion – physical abuse
[on the part of] the local folk [narod] for the use of Russian.”33
It is interesting in this context that the head of the Catholic
hierarchy in the Vilna diocese did not bother to refer to the
Vatican’s explicit prohibition of using Russian in Catholic
churches and limited himself to practical arguments.
Thus in 1884 when once again an energetically anti-
Polish ﬁgure, I. S. Kakhanov, became governor general of
Vilna, he found much to be desired in local Catholic
churches. In a long (over 100 pp.) report sent to St. Peters-
burg in 1885, Kakhanov complained that in fact very little
had changed since before 1863: “The Roman Catholic clergy,
merging Polish political ideas with the Catholic religion, has
created, so to speak, a new Polish-Catholic religion and
attempts to fanaticize the peasant masses [narodnye massy]
and then to subject them to [the clergy’s] inﬂuence.” In fact,
practically the only positive effect of the post-1863 restric-
tions on the clergy had been to force them to exercise
“superﬁcially. greater caution.”34 Kakhanov complained
that the renewed relations with Rome encouraged the
“fanatic priests” and their bishop Karol Hryniewiecki, in
their anti-government and anti-Russian activities.35 The31 RGIA, f. 821, op. 125, 1877, d. 288, l. 24. The incident occurred in
“Polonechskii kostel, Novogrudskii uezd” on 24 July 1877.
32 RGIA, f. 821, op. 125, 1877, d. 288, ll. 110-111.
33 RGIA, f. 821, op. 125, 1877, d. 288, ll. 159-160. This letter is dated 19
September 1878.
34 RGIA, f. 821, op. 125, 1884, d. 312, ll. 9v, 10.
35 Russia renewed relations with the Vatican – brieﬂy – in 1882. On the
complicated diplomacy between Rome and St. Petersburg during this
period, see Winter, 1961 and especially Chapter 6: “Der russisch-vat-
ikanische Vertrag von 1881,” pp. 370–381.
T. Weeks / Journal of Eurasian Studies 2 (2011) 52–59 57governor general did not clearly advocate the introduction of
Russian into local Catholic churches (though his discussion
of the topic shows that, in fact, nowidespread use of Russian
there had yet occurred), but he energetically pleaded for the
elimination of Polish: “The Polish language. cannot be
tolerated in the [local Catholic] church [kostel] as symbol of
a hostile nationality [narodnost’].” In a region where Poles
made up only 15.58% of the Catholic population, Kakhanov
argued, the use of Polish in churches was unacceptable.36
The Committee of Ministers did not accept Kakhanov’s
arguments. First of all, if Polish were to be removed from
supplementary religious services in Catholic churches of
the Northwest provinces, it would have to be replaced by
some other language and, with the exception of the Latvian
Catholics of Vitebsk province or Lithuanians of Kovno
province (who were barely mentioned here), that language
would have to be Russian. Attempting to introduce the
Russian language in Catholic churches could only have bad
effects, both in Russia’s relations with the Vatican and at
the locally. Given the lack of Papally-sanctioned religious
books or even a Russian-language Bible translation, any
attempt to push for russiﬁcation of the Catholic churches
would necessarily meet with stiff opposition from Rome.
Furthermore, even if the Pope could be persuaded to agree,
the Catholic clergy might very well simply use Russian for
their own anti-government agitation.37
This is not to say that Russianwasnot used in any Catholic
churches in the Northwest Provinces. While it is notoriously
difﬁcult to ascertain exactlywhat transpired at the local level,
a report fromtheRomanCatholicauthorities regardingMinsk
province listed thirty-four parishes in which Russian had
been introduced by 1884.38 Yet, nearly twenty years later, the
quite liberal governor general of Vilna, PrinceP.D. Sviatopolk-
Mirskii, could write in his report for 1902–1903 that Belaru-
sian Catholics should be allowed the opportunity of using
their “native language” (rodnoi iazyk) in church – in other
words, Polish continued to be the norm.39Mirskii’s successor
in Vilna, K. F. Krshivitskii, remarked in a similar vein that the
government should not only encourage the use of Belarusian
in churches, but should also print books in Belarusian (using
the Cyrillic script) and allow the use of Belarusian as the
language of instruction in local elementary schools.40 Even
after the ukaz of religious toleration of 17 April 1905, debates
on the proper place of Russian in the Catholic churches of the
Northwest provinces continued unabated.4136 Winter, 1961, ll. 11v-15, 40-42, quotation from l. 41v.
37 Winter, 1961 ll. 198-206. ("Vypiska iz zhurnalov Komiteta Ministrov
28 aprelia i 12 maia 1887 g").
38 RGIA, f. 821, op. 138, 1897, d. 24, l. 172.
39 RGIA, f. 1284, op. 190, 1899, d. 84b, ll. 12v-13. When Sviatopolk-Mirskii
wrote “native language,” he meant Russian which included the dialect of
Belarusian.
40 LVIA, ll. 4-5 (this letter, addressed to Minister of Internal Affairs P.
Stolypin, is dated 20 August 1906).
41 See, for example, the newspaper clippings and Correspondence in
RGIA, f. 821, op. 128, 1911, d. 30; and the report by A. V. Petrov on “anti-
government activity” of Catholic clergymen, dated 26 April 1911: RGIA, f.
821, op. 150, 1911, d. 152. For information on the nationality of Catholics in
Vil’na, Vitebsk, Grodno, Minsk, Kiev, Volyn, and Podolia provinces in 1910
(and on the languages used in Catholic churches there), see RGIA, f. 821,
op. 150, 190, d. 144.What do these debates, projects, and polemics tell us
about Catholicism in Russia? For one thing, it is clear that
St. Petersburg was quite reluctant to interfere in the reli-
gious sphere, and accusations such as Father Lescoeur’s of
concerted efforts toward mass conversations are quite
misleading, to say the least. On the other hand, it was a rare
Russian ofﬁcial indeed who did not take for granted the
inherent hostility of Catholic clergy – though Catholic
peasants were often portrayed as victims of fanaticism
whose loyalty to the government and “Russian things”
could possibly be achieved. The fact that these peasants
were for the most part not of Polish ethnicity but either
“Russians” (Belarusians) or Lithuanians conveniently
dovetailed with ofﬁcial policy attempting to divide
“Polonism” from Catholicism. Logically, then, ofﬁcial
Russian policy should have encouraged the development of
Belarusian and Lithuanian national identity to counter
Polish inﬂuences. As we will see, however, St. Petersburg
was just as reluctant to foment national movements as it
was to interfere directly in the internal workings of the
Catholic church in Russia.
3. Belarusians and Lithuanians: ours or theirs?
Lithuanians rivaledPoles as themostCatholic nationality
in the Russian Empire – in both cases, over 98% of native
speakers were of the Catholic faith.42 And yet, as I have
attempted to show elsewhere, the Russian government
rarely considered Lithuanians a threat to state interests or
the effort to reclaim the Northwest provinces – including
Kovno/Kaunas province, where Lithuanians and “Samo-
gitians” made up nearly two-thirds of the total population
(in 1897).43 Belarusians were an even more ambiguous
group – according to 1897 statistics,18% of Belarusianswere
Catholic; this was the main “target group” for the unsuc-
cessful efforts to bring Russian into use in Catholic churches.
Some local ofﬁcials urged a more activist stance to “save”
Belarusian Catholics frompolonization, while in other cases
the strengthof thePolish¼Catholic equationblottedout the
“Russian” ethnicity of this peasant folk.
Lithuanians, unlike Belarusians, were at least linguisti-
cally easily distinguishable from their Slavic neighbors.
While contemporary ethnographers – and the census of
1897 – divided the ethnicity into “Lithuanians” (litovtsy)
and “Samogitians (zhmud’), the cultural and linguistic
differences between these two groups are relatively minor.
One factor that united all Lithuanians – and linked them
with Poles – was their fervent Catholicism. As we have
seen, Russian ofﬁcials repeatedly emphasized the near
“fanatical” devotion of the Lithuanians to the Catholic
Church. At the same time, these same ofﬁcials rarely por-
trayed the Lithuanian peasantry as particularly hostile or
dangerous for Russia. Rather, the Lithuanian Catholics were42 Bauer et al. (1991) Both “Polish” and “Lithuanian” native speakers
were 98.25% Catholic, while “Samogitian” (now considered Lithuanian)
native speakers were 98.52% Catholic.
43 The exact ﬁgures are: 998,896 Lithuanians and “Zhmud’” of a total
population of 1,544,564 or 64.67%. Catholics made up 76.52% of Kovno
province’s population. Figured from Table XIV: Raspredelenie naseleniia
po veroispovedaniiam i rodnomu iazyku, 1904.
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culturalists who had little interest in political intrigue.44
One can thus argue that at least in this case, Catholicism
itself was seen as less of a problem than Polonism. From
this follows the logic of the Russian prohibition of printing
Lithuanian in Latin letters. When St. Petersburg enacted
these policies after 1863, it was hoped that printing Lith-
uanian in Cyrillic would reduce Polish inﬂuence on them
and facilitate their learning of Russian. This prohibition
was, of course, a huge miscalculation. As should have been
realized even in the 1860s, the association of Cyrillic letters
with the Russian Orthodox faith caused patriotic Lithua-
nians (many of them, of course, priests) to reject the reform
and the new books (of which few, in any event, were
actually published) published in Cyrillic letters.45
In the last decades of the nineteenth century, clashes
between Lithuanians and Poles in Catholic churches
became increasingly frequent. While Russian ofﬁcials
welcomed the weakening of Polish domination over Lith-
uanian Catholics, they also expressed misgivings at the
threat to public order presented by these clashes. An
exchange of letters between the acting minister of internal
affairs D. S. Sipiagin and Warsaw Governor General Prince
A. K. Imeretinskii reﬂects these concerns. The correspon-
dence was occasioned by complaints of physical violence
and intimidation by Lithuanians of their Polish-speaking
neighbors in Suwa1ki (Suvalkiai) province. The provincial
head of the gendarmes in Suwa3ki blamed these distur-
bances on the local bishop Antoni Baranovskii (Bar-
anauskas), whom he characterized as a “fervent Lithuanian
patriot” (iaryi litvoman).46 In reaction to this report, Sipia-
gin wrote Imeretinskii: “The present movement aimed at
separating Lithuanians from Poles in of itself can not be
considered a phenomenon dangerous to our state interests
and, to a certain extent, if held within limits, would be
useful.” Nonetheless, the present disturbances were an
indication that some of Baranovskii’s “most zealous
comrades-in-arms [spodvizhniki]” were pushing things too
quickly. Sipiagin concluded that the bishop should warn to
select his “co-workers” more carefully in order to avoid
further disturbances.47
Governor general Imeretinskii’s appraisal of the situa-
tion differed little from Sipiagin’s. Writing in a letter to the
minister he stated his opinion that this recent “rise in
national and cultural consciousness [among Lithuanians in
Suvalkai province] and the striving to liberate the Lithua-
nian folk [plemia] from polonization does not contradict
state interests. The tasks of local governmental policy must
be limited, in my opinion, to vigilant observation and
timely prevention in this ethnic [plemennoi] and cultural44 For more on ofﬁcial Russia and the Lithuanians, see Weeks, 2001b.
See also the many excellent works by Staliûnas, 2004a; and Staliunas,
2007.
45 On this period, see Ochmañski, 1965; Rodzkiewicz, 1998; Merkys,
1978; and Staliûnas, 2004b.
46 RGIA, f. 821, op. 2, 1897, d. 73 (“Litovskoe dvizhenie v prikhodakh s
pol’sko-litovskim naseleniem”), ll. 15-17.
47 RGIA, f. 821, op. 2, 1897, d. 73 (“Litovskoe dvizhenie v prikhodakh s
pol’sko-litovskim naseleniem”), ll. 22-23. Sipiagin’s letter is dated
December 12, 1899.struggle of any extreme [rezkie] manifestations of the
national idea which could negatively affect [otrazitsia]
public order and tranquility.” Along these lines Imeretinskii
sent a letter to Bishop Baranovskii asking him to work to
prevent further disturbances and outbreaks of “national
hostility” in his diocese.48 In the following decade, and
particularly after 1905, such disturbances – or at least their
discussion in the press and in ofﬁcial documents – became
ever more frequent, but the position of Russian ofﬁcialdom
changed little.49 In essence, they were happy to see Lithu-
anians actively opposing polonization and worried only
about possible public disorder caused by over-zealous
individuals.
This opinion is also reﬂected in the massive report for
1902–1903 of governor general of Vilna, Prince P. D. Svia-
topolk-Mirskii. Mirskii pointed out that Lithuanian Catho-
lics generally-held sermons in their own language and
were interested in national development. Echoing
a common theme, the governor general emphasized the
need to avoid equating “Catholic” with “Pole.” In particular
now, as educationwas spreading among Lithuanians, it was
necessary to recognize and welcome that movement.50 In
the end, however, Mirskii appeared to doubt that the
Lithuanians could survive as a distinct nationality. Because
of their small numbers and lack of historical traditions,
Mirskii argued, ultimately the Lithuanians would “be
absorbed into the general population of Russia” (voiti v
obshchii sostav naseleniia Rossii).51 In the short run, that is,
Lithuanians would liberate themselves from Polish inﬂu-
ence but over time they would gradually become assimi-
lated and grow more like Russians.
The Belarusian Catholics were an even trickier issue for
Russian ofﬁcialdom. Like the Uniates that had by 1875 been
ofﬁcially “re-absorbed” into the Orthodox Church, the
Belarusian Catholics violated the generally-held belief that
“Russian” and “Orthodox” were equivalent terms.52 While
this issue deserves more attention than I can give it here, I
will argue that even to 1914, even while arguing that
“Catholic” and “Polish” should not be seen as equivalent, the
Russian government (indeed, Russian society) continued to
ﬁnd disturbing the idea of a non-Orthodox Russian. Even
when the theoretical possibility of “Russian Catholics” is
admitted, it is clear that this is a conceptual concession tothe
dominant deﬁnition of Russian as pravoslavnyi.
Vil’na Governor General Petr Sviatopolk-Mirskii devoted
considerable space to the Belarusians in his extensive
report for 1902-1903. Whether Orthodox or Catholic, he
claimed, “speaking their distinctive dialect of Russian even
to the present time do not consider themselves as48 RGIA, f. 821, op. 2, 1897, d. 73 (“Litovskoe dvizhenie v prikhodakh s
pol’sko-litovskim naseleniem”), ll. 24-28.
49 On the Polish-Lithuanian conﬂict see, for example: RGIA, f. 821, op.
128, 1911, d. 36; RGIA, f. 821, op. 128, 1912, d. 701; RGIA, f. 821, op. 150,
“posle 1911,” d. 154; and Lietuvos centrinis valsybinis istorijos archyvas,
Vilnius (LVIA), f. 378, BS 1910, b. 78.
50 RGIA, f. 1284, op. 190, d. 84B, ll. 13v-14.
51 RGIA, f. 1284, op. 190, d. 84B, ll. 38v-39.
52 On the “re-uniting” (vozsoedinenie) of Uniates in 1839 and 1875, see
Weeks, 2001; and Weeks, 1995.
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that Sviatpolk-Mirskii felt the need to remark speciﬁc that
these “Russians” did not consider themselves Poles.
Government policy, he continued, needed to discard the
still prevalent idea that “what is Catholic is at the same time
Polish, and what is not Orthodox isn’t Russian.” Rather, he
stated, “I consider it necessary to give the Catholic church
a certain amount of freedom (dat’ izvestnyi prostor) as long
as this does not work to the detriment of the Orthodox
church.” As for Belarusian Catholics speciﬁcally, they must
be convinced that the government does not aim to convert
them to Orthodoxy, but at the same time the language of
worship in their churches should be “their native tongue
rather than Polish, which is at present used.” All of these
quite liberal sentiments, however, are called into question
by a passing remark: “At the same time (pri etom), I cannot
help expressing my conﬁdence (uverennost’) that once the
consciousness of being a Russian tribe (plemia) becomes
instilled in the Belarusian folk (plemia), it will by itself
(samo) return to the bosom of the Orthodox church
(obratit’sia v lono prvoslavnoi tserkvi).”54
The internal contradiction within Sviatopolk-Mirskii’s
report points to the extreme tenaciousness of the
Catholic ¼ Pole equation and to the central place of Ortho-
doxy in Russian national identity. Even while explicitly
arguing for a broader deﬁnition of “Russian” to include non-
Orthodox, Sviatopolk-Mirskii’s own passing comment
reveals that he did not himself quite believe in this solution.
To the end of the Russian Empire and perhaps longer, the
religious element remained the singlemost important factor
in categorizing an individual or group as ‘ours’ or ‘theirs.’And
for the vast majority of Russian ofﬁcials (and Russian
society?), Catholics remained ifnot ahostile force, then inany
case a foreign body within the Russian Empire, deserving
perhaps tolerationbut certainlynot recognitionas “ourown.”
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